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Summary Findings
This paper demonstrates that there are potentially large
returns to social protection policy that stakes out a
productive safety net below the vulnerable and keeps
them from slipping into a poverty trap. Much of the
value of the productive safety net comes from mitigating
the ex ante effects of risk and crowding in additional
investment. The analysis also explores the implications
of different mechanisms of targeting social protection
transfers. In the presence of poverty traps, modestly
regressive targeting based on critical asset thresholds



















































































































dPoverty Traps and Social Protection?




This paper demonstrates that there are potentially large returns to social protec-
tion policy that stakes out a productive safety net below the vulnerable and keeps
them from slipping into a poverty trap. Much of the value of the productive safety
net comes from mitigating the ex ante e⁄ects of risk and crowding in additional
investment. The analysis also explores the implications of di⁄erent mechanisms of
targeting social protection transfers. In the presence of poverty traps, modestly
regressive targeting based on critical asset thresholds may have better long-run
poverty reduction e⁄ects than traditional needs-based targeting.
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2 University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA Poverty Traps and Social Protection
Poverty traps caused by the existence of multiple dynamic equilibria attract
ever-growing attention, among both economic researchers and development
policymakers. 3 In this paper, we focus not on why or if poverty traps exist,
but rather on the implications of poverty traps for the design and performance
of poverty reduction policies. This topic remains remarkably underexplored
even though the poverty traps concept underpins much current development
policy discourse. 4 As we explore, multiple equilibria can create stark tradeo⁄s
between helping those who are currently poorest versus preventing descents
into poverty among an initially non-poor, middle class group. Not only is
there a tradeo⁄ between preventing and responding to poverty, but because
bene￿t levels associated with transfer programs operating on a ￿xed budget
are determined endogenously as people descend into or graduate from poverty,
the most progressive transfer policies may trade o⁄greater reductions in near-
term poverty for higher future poverty rates. Over time, today￿ s poor may
actually bene￿t from policies that protect the assets of a vulnerable but some-
what better-o⁄middle class if such social protection stimulates investment by
the poor and eventually reduces the size of the poor subpopulation needing
support from transfer programs with a ￿xed budget. Ultimately, we demon-
strate that poverty traps can have a pronounced e⁄ect on the performance
and appropriate design of poverty reduction policies. This fundamental point
appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature to date.
This paper explores these issue with a stochastic dynamic programming model
of individual asset accumulation in the presence of innate ability di⁄erences,
heterogeneous asset endowments, multiple production technologies and risk.
As in many such models, multiple equilibria and an associated poverty trap
are generated by assumptions of missing ￿nancial markets and non-convexities
in production (i.e., ￿xed costs of investment and innovation). These assump-
tions create a ￿ Micawber Frontier￿which divides the innate ability￿ initial asset
space into multiple regions of distinct, dynamically optimal behavior. 5 In-
dividuals located above the Micawber Frontier ￿nd it feasible to accumulate
3 Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), Bowles et al. (2006) and Carter and Barrett
(2006) provide excellent overviews of the relevant literature.
4 For example, Sachs (2005) relies heavily on the poverty trap idea in making a
case for massive increases in international development assistance to low-income
countries, but without directly teasing out speci￿c design implications.
5 As discussed by Carter and Barrett (2006), the phrase Micawber Threshold was
￿rst used by Michael Lipton to describe a point below which it is di¢ cult for agents
ever to accumulate assets. The idea was subsequently adopted by Zimmerman and
Carter (2003) who give it a meaning similar to that used here. The image echoes
the travails of Wilkins Micawber, the perpetually insolvent debtor in Dickens￿David
Copper￿eld.
2assets, adopt the improved production technology and eventually climb out of
poverty. Those below the frontier do not. Because the frontier is in￿nite for
individuals below a minimum ability level, there is a region of what might be
termed ￿intrinsic chronic poverty.￿ The model thus captures the ability di⁄er-
ences that ￿gure prominently in some empirical discussions of chronic poverty
(Chronic Poverty Research Centre 2005, Santos and Barrett 2006), as well
as the bifurcated wealth dynamics that ￿gure prominently in the theoretical
poverty traps literature. 6
In addition to making clear the complex nature of chronic poverty, the model
also shows that exposure to risk and shocks play especially pernicious roles
when poverty traps exist. Ex post, realized shocks can have irreversible conse-
quences for agents who get pushed below the critical threshold. In addition,
the ex ante anticipation of shocks shifts out the endogenous threshold, mak-
ing escape from poverty less likely as agents become less willing to sacri￿ce
current consumption to accumulate risky assets. Policies that compensate
individuals for the e⁄ects of realized shocks or insure them against future
losses can crowd-in investment and have a major e⁄ect on the incidence of
chronic poverty, even taking into account agents￿natural behavioral response
to insurance (i.e., moral hazard).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the sto-
chastic dynamic programming model of individual asset accumulation. Section
2 then uses this framework to form a stylized model of a poverty trap econ-
omy. As a baseline for later analysis of alternative policy regimes, we simulate
the stylized economy over a sixty year time horizon, tracking the evolution of
GDP, technology adoption, inequality and standard Foster-Greer-Throbecke
(FGT) poverty measures, as well as a new measure of unnecessary deprivation.
Section 3 explores the design of programs intended to aid the poor, either by
making progressive, needs-based transfers, or by o⁄ering a productive social
safety net that o⁄ers insurance against potentially catastrophic asset losses.
These experiments are perhaps best characterized as relief programs in that
they are ex post and they are assumed to be unanticipated by agents in the
economy. 7 In the presence of poverty traps needs-based allocation rules can
lead to a long-run ￿relief trap￿ for development assistance because agents
fall into a poverty trap due to asset shocks, swelling the ranks of the poor
and thereby ultimately reducing assistance to the poorest due to increased
6 This ￿nding suggests that much of the empirical literature on poverty traps (in-
cluding our own) has been misguided in imposing a single model of welfare dynamics
on data generated by heterogeneous agents. Santos and Barrett (2006) is an excep-
tion.
7 This does not strictly require that agents are ignorant of the possibility of trans-
fers, merely that assistance is su¢ ciently unreliable that agents behave as if such
policies do not exist.
3competition for scarce relief resources. While in the near term the productive
safety net implies regressive targeting among the subpopulation of poor and
vulnerable agents, by preventing collapse into poverty by agents vulnerable
to asset risk, it reduces poverty and leads to greater transfers to and higher
welfare for the intrinsically poor in later years.
Section 4 then explores what happens when a program of sporadic, unan-
ticipated relief is replaced with a a systematic program of fully anticipated
social protection. While anticipation of social protection creates an element
of standard, output-reducing (and indemnity payment-increasing) negative
moral hazard, it can also create what we term positive moral hazard, wherein
individuals are induced to take on more risk and invest more. But rather than
increasing the likelihood of subsequent indemnity payments, this induced risk
taking behavior reduces that likelihood of indemnity payments and stimulates
output growth. While the e⁄ects of negative moral hazard appear potentially
substantial under a naive program design, we show how modest changes in
program structure can markedly shift the balance between negative and posi-
tive moral hazard. Section 5 concludes the paper with implications for further
research and for social protection policy design.
41 Poverty Traps: Assets, Ability, Risk and the Multiple Dimen-
sions of Chronic Poverty
The growing literature on poverty traps o⁄ers a range of theoretical models
that generate multiple dynamic welfare equilibria, at least one of which falls
beneath a poverty line. Dercon (2003), Banerjee and Du￿ o (2004), Azariadis
and Stachurski (2005) and Bowles et al. (2006) provide excellent summaries of
that literature. Our focus in this paper is on micro-(household-)level poverty
traps, especially forward-looking agents￿asset accumulation and welfare dy-
namics in an economic environment characterized by credit constraints, a non-
convex production technology set, heterogeneous agent ability and initial asset
endowments, and non-existent labor and asset rental markets. Our model thus
resembles other models of poverty traps in the sense that some households do
not invest ￿nor choose the more pro￿table technology ￿because the current
cost of investment is large compared to the future returns to investment for
those with low initial wealth when they cannot borrow against future expected
earnings. 8
In what follows we build on Buera￿ s (2005) non-stochastic model of asset
accumulation with two production technologies under credit constraints and
heterogeneous agent ability. We extend Buera￿ s model by adding asset shocks
to allow for the importance of both ex ante awareness of risk and the ex post
experience of shocks as key determinants of poverty dynamics (Elbers and
Gunning 2005). We show that intermediate ability households dramatically
change asset accumulation and production choices in response to ex ante asset
risk and ex post realization of asset shocks. This section and that result help
motivate our focus in subsequent sections on prospective safety net policies
and associated moral hazard concerns.
1.1 A Model of Asset Dynamics and Heterogeneous Ability
Consider an economy in which each individual i is endowed with a level of
innate ability (￿i) as well as an initial stock of capital (ki1). Preferences are
unrelated to the individual￿ s innate ability. In what follows, we treat ￿i as
￿xed. We conceptualize the agents in this economy as adults and ￿i as cap-
turing the e⁄ectively immutable physical stature, cognitive development and
educational attainment with which they enter adulthood and thus the econ-
omy. This obviously ignores the origins of such innate ability. Exploring the
8 Related previous papers include Becker and Tomes (1979), Loury (1981), Banerjee
and Newman (1991, 1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Ray and Streufert (1993), Aghion
and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), Carter and Zimmerman (2000), Ghatak, Morelli
and Sjostrom (2001) and Ghatak and Jiang (2002).
5multigenerational extension to the present model, by endogenizing ￿i, seems a
promising topic for future research, not least of which because it would directly
address the economic growth and poverty reduction e⁄ects of early childhood
nutrition, health and education interventions. In this paper, however, we set
those questions aside in order to concentrate on exploring social protection
policy design in the presence of poverty traps.
Each period the individual has to choose between two alternative technologies
for generating income. Both technologies are capital using and skill-sensitive
(i.e., for both technologies, more able people can produce more than less able
people). One technology (the ￿high ￿ technology) is subject to ￿xed costs,
E, such that the technology is not worth using at low amounts of capital.








it under the low technology
fH(￿i;kit) = ￿k
￿H
it ￿ E under the high technology
where 0 < ￿L < ￿H < 1. The individual interested in maximizing income will
optimally employing the high technology if and only if kit equals or exceeds
the critical level b k(￿i) = fkjfL(￿i;k) = fH(￿i;k)g. 9
If an individual had access to only one technology, she or he would accumulate
capital up to a unique steady state values k￿
L(￿i) for the low technology or
k￿
H(￿i) for the high technology. The key question is then what happens when
the individual has access to both technologies. In particular, will an individual
whose initial capital stock is below b k(￿i) gravitate toward the high or the low
technology and, relatedly, toward the higher or lower income level associated
with the di⁄erent technologies? Consider the case of an individual who begins
life with k￿
L(￿i) < ki0 < b k(￿i): Note that because this individual is beyond
the low level steady state, incremental returns to further investment are low
and discourage further investment. Will this individual optimally accumulate
assets over time, and ending up at k￿
H(￿i) and a non-poor standard of living?
Alternatively, will the individual settle into a poor standard of living with
capital stock k￿
L(￿i)? More formally, is there an initial asset threshold, which
we will denote e k(￿i); below which individuals stay at the low equilibrium
(remaining chronically poor), and above which she or he will move to the high
equilibrium (eventually becoming non-poor)?
We analyze this question with a model of dynamic choice. Given the income
9 By construction, this formulation favors adoption of the high technology by as-
suming away information problems and all other obstacles to adoption other than
￿nancing. These simpli￿cations merely eliminate inessential factors that reinforce
this e⁄ect.
6generation process shown above, assume that in every period individuals al-
locate the income they earn between consumption and the accumulation of
productive assets:
ct + it ￿ f(￿i;kit);
where ct is household consumption in period t and it is household investment
in period t. The household￿ s stock of accumulated capital evolves over time
according to the following rule:
kit+1 = ￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kit];
where ￿ is the asset depreciation rate and ￿t is a random variable realized
every period t. 10 Individuals cannot borrow against future earnings to build
up capital and can only pursue autarchic accumulation strategies. Note that
￿ = 1 indicates that there is no shock, whereas ￿ < 1 indicates a negative
shock that destroys some fraction of assets. While in principal ￿ > 1 might
be allowed, such events seem unlikely and we will restrict the analysis to the
case where only negative shocks are possible, i.e., ￿t 2 [0;1]. The cumulative
density function of ￿t is denoted by ￿(￿) and we assume that every household
knows ￿(￿). The decision-maker￿ s allocation choice at period ￿ is therefore






s.t. ct + it ￿ f(￿i;kit)
kit+1 = ￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kit]
ki￿ given
where E￿ is expectation at the start of period ￿, ￿ is the time discount fac-
tor, and u(￿) is the utility function de￿ned over consumption ct and has the
usual properties. Denote the investment rule in the presence of asset shocks
as i￿(ktj￿;￿). 11
10 This asset shock is the only source of stochasticity considered here. Incorporating
income shocks would make the choice of technology more complicated, but will
not fundamentally change the nature of our results as long as the income risk is
stationary.
11 More precisely, i￿(ktj￿;￿) is the policy function of the following Bellman equation:
V (kt) ￿ max
it
fu(f(￿;kt) ￿ it) + ￿E [V (kt+1jkt;it)]g
where E [V (kt+1jkt;it)] =
Z
V (￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt])d￿(￿t)
where ￿(￿) is cumulative density function of ￿t.
71.2 The Micawber Frontier and the Two Dimensions of Chronic Poverty
As in Buera (2005), this model identi￿es a critical asset level, denoted e k(￿);
for each level of skill or ability. An individual with ability level ￿i will attempt
to accumulate the assets needed to adopt the high technology if she enjoys
capital stock ki￿ > e k(￿i). Otherwise, she will only pursue the low technology,
accumulating the modest stock of capital that it requires. Note that this
frontier, a generalization of what Carter and Barrett (2006) call the Micawber
Threshold, divides those who have the wealth needed to accumulate from those
who do not. We label e k(￿) the Micawber Frontier.
Figure 1, created through numerical analysis of the dynamic programming
model, illustrates the Micawber Frontier. 12 Along the horizontal axis are
innate ability or skill levels, ranging from least to most able. The vertical
axis measures the stock of productive assets. The solid curve is the Micawber
Frontier for the basic model.
To ease discussion and link it to more conventional poverty analysis, Figure
1 also includes an ￿asset poverty line,￿illustrated as the dashed downward
sloping line. For each ability level, this asset poverty line indicates the stock
of assets the individual must have in order to produce a living standard exactly
equal to a money metric poverty line, yp. We de￿ne this poverty line as the
level of income that a reference middle ability person (￿ = 1:12) would produce
were she in steady state equilibrium at the low technology. This assumption
is of course arbitrary, 13 but it has the advantage of rendering most individuals
poor unless they craft a pathway to the high technology. This is desirable in
our stylized model as it creates a strong linkage between improved technology
adoption, income and poverty measures.
Note that the Micawber Frontier has a behavioral foundation and thus di⁄ers
from from the asset poverty line, which is based on a standard (and there-
fore somewhat arbitrary) income poverty line. 14 Those agents whose initial
12 Buera provides a formal proof for his non-stochastic model. Appendix 1 details
the parameterization used to implement the numerical analysis of the stochastic
model discussed in the remainder of the paper. The piece-wise linear shape of
the Micawber Frontier arises from the discretization of ￿: The ￿ner grained ￿;the
smoother the frontier.
13 Standard poverty lines are of course inherently arbitrary. In contrast, the Micaw-
ber Frontier has a behavioral foundation, as well as strong behavioral implications,
as Hoddinott (2006) discusses, and can be thought of as a dynamic asset poverty
line (Carter and Barrett 2006, Carter and Ikegami 2007).
14 As discussed by Carter and Ikegami (forthcoming), this characteristic of the Mi-
cawber Frontier makes it an interesting candidate as the base for chronic poverty
measures.
8Fig. 1. Risk and the Micawber Threshold
ability-asset endowment places them above the Micawber Frontier but be-
neath the asset poverty line will be initially but only transitorily poor as they
naturally accumulate their way out of poverty. By contrast, those whose ini-
tial ability-asset endowment situates them beneath the Micawber Frontier but
above the asset poverty line will not be poor initially, but will steadily eat into
their asset holdings and will eventually become poor. These movements repre-
sent structural transitions across the poverty line. There can also be stochastic
movements around the asset poverty line among the subpopulation that ￿nds
itself above the Micawber Frontier. For those individuals, small asset shocks
may temporarily leave them beneath the asset poverty line without driving
them o⁄their growth path toward the high equilibrium. Of course, individuals
could ￿nd themselves above (below) both the Micawber Frontier and the asset
poverty line, in which case they would be always non-poor (poor). This simple
depiction of the Micawber Frontier and the asset poverty line thereby captures
the full range of conventional static and dynamic poverty measures. 15
As illustrated in Figure 1, the numerical analysis identi￿es three distinct re-
15 See Carter and Barrett (2006) for a discussion of distinct generations of poverty
analysis that encompass these di⁄erent ideas.
9gions in the space of ability and initial asset holdings. Irrespective of their cap-
ital endowment, high skill individuals with ￿i > ￿H will always move toward
the high equilibrium as e k(￿) = 08 ￿i > ￿H. When they reach the technology
shift asset threshold b k(￿i) they will optimally switch to the higher technology.
Irrespective of their starting position, these Upwardly Mobile agents steadily
converge to the steady state asset value for the high technology. They may
be poor over some extended period as they move toward their steady state
value, but eventually they should become non-poor by virtue of the optimal
accumulation behavior induced by their high ability endowment..
In contrast, those with an innate ability level below the critical level ￿L will
never move toward the high technology irrespective of their initial asset en-
dowment. This critical skill level de￿nes a region of intrinsic chronic poverty,
made up of individuals who lack the ability to achieve a non-poor standard of
living in their existing economic context. 16
Finally, those in the intermediate skill group with ￿L < ￿i < ￿H have positive
but ￿nite values e k(￿). If su¢ ciently well-endowed with assets (ki0 > e k(￿)),
these intermediate ability individuals will accumulate additional assets over
time, and would be expected to adopt the high technology and eventually reach
a non-poor standard of living. If they begin with assets below e k(￿), however,
these individuals will no longer ￿nd the high equilibrium attainable and will
settle into a low standard of living. Like those in the region of intrinsic chronic
poverty, intermediate ability individuals initially endowed with less than e k(￿)
will be chronically poor. Unlike the intrinsically chronically poor, the chronic
poverty of the intermediate skilled individuals is needless in the sense that
they could be helped to lift themselves out of poverty with appropriate social
protection policies, as we discuss below. The total number of chronically poor
in any society will thus depend on the distribution of households across the
ability-wealth space.
1.3 The Ex-post and Ex-ante E⁄ects of Asset Shocks
The Micawber Frontier is a function of the economic environment in which
individuals ￿nd themselves. In particular, the stochastic term ￿ fundamentally
shapes investment behavior. We now explore the impact of ex ante risk and
ex post shocks on investment and the long-term evolution of poverty.
The ex post e⁄ect of realized shocks comes about simply because negative
events may destroy assets, knocking people o⁄their expected path of accumu-
lation. For upwardly mobile individuals, such shocks may delay their arrival
16 CPRC (2004) gives examples of individuals who su⁄er such fundamental disabil-
ities.
10at the upper level equilibrium, or knock them down from it, necessitating a
period of additional savings and asset reaccumulation. But it does not set
them on a di⁄erent accumulation path. Similarly, shocks have no long-term
e⁄ect on the equilibrium toward which the low ability intrinsically chronically
poor gravitate.
In contrast, the ex post consequences of shocks can be rather more severe for
households of intermediate ability. Consider the case of a household that is
initially slightly above the Micawber Frontier. A shock that knocks it below
that frontier will banish the household into the ranks of the chronically poor
as in the wake of the shock, the household will alter its strategy and move
toward the low equilibrium (divesting itself of assets).
While these ex post e⁄ects of shocks are important, the anticipation that
they might take place would be expected to generate a ￿sense of insecurity, of
potential harm people must feel wary of￿ something bad can happen and ￿ spell
ruin,￿ ￿as Calvo and Dercon (2005 p.5) put it. Numerical analysis of the model
shows that this sense of impending ruin indeed discourages forward-looking
households from making the sacri￿ces necessary to reach the high equilibrium.
The Micawber Frontier shifts to the southwest once asset risk is removed, as
shown in Figure 1. The dashed curve is the Micawber Frontier in the absence
of risk. The boundaries marking the critical skill levels at which households
move between the di⁄erent accumulation regimes also shift out, meaning more
intrinsically upwardly mobile households and fewer intrinsically chronically
poor households when we eliminate the ex ante e⁄ects of risk.
The most dramatic e⁄ects of risk are seen by considering a household whose
skill and capital endowments place it between the two frontiers. Consider a
household whose skill and initial asset endowments are represented by the solid
circle in the middle of Figure 1. Absent the risk of asset shocks, such a house-
hold would strive for the upper equilibrium and eventually escape poverty. In
the presence of risk, such a household would abandon this accumulation strat-
egy as futile and settle into a low level, chronically poor standard of living. In
the face of asset risk, the extraordinary sacri￿ce of consumption required to
try to reach the high equilibrium is no longer worthwhile, and the household
will optimally pursue the low level, poverty trap equilibrium. By contrast,
the shift has no signi￿cant behavioral e⁄ect on either intrinsically chronically
poor households (represented by the solid diamond on the left side of Figure
1) or intrinsically upwardly mobile households (the solid triangle on the right
side of Figure 1).
To explore the di⁄erential e⁄ects of risk and shocks on these di⁄erent sub-
populations, we simulated the income streams generated in three distinct set-
tings:
11￿ A non-stochastic economy in which agents repeatedly apply the optimal
investment rule, i￿
nr(ktj￿i) 17 ,
￿ An economy characterized by risk without realized shocks in which agents
follow the risk-adjusted optimal accumulation rule, i￿(ktj￿i;￿), but never
actually experience shocks (a scenario that allows us to isolate the ex ante
e⁄ects of risk); and,
￿ A fully stochastic economy, meaning that individuals not only follow the
risk-adjusted optimal investment rule but each period they are subject to a
random asset shock generated in accordance with the probability structure
￿.
These simulations show that for the intrinsically chronically poor (low ￿i) and
the upwardly mobile (high ￿i) groups, the e⁄ects of risk are relatively mod-
est and attributable almost entirely to the disruptive, ex post e⁄ects of asset
shocks. By contrast, for the intermediate ability group, the ex ante behavioral
(i.e., investment disincentive) e⁄ects of uninsured risk account for most of
the welfare e⁄ects due to asset stochasticity. These e⁄ects are also large in
magnitude. While the discounted income streams for the other two groups
fall only 5-10 percent in the fully stochastic scenario, the drop is approxi-
mately 25 percent for the intermediate ability group, with roughly 90 percent
of the losses due to the ex ante risk e⁄ect exclusively. 18 The di⁄erence arises
because while risk slightly reduces the desired steady state capital stock for
low and high ability agents, mainly it forces them to regularly rebuild assets
in order to reattain the desired steady state capital stock. In sharp contrast,
intermediate ability agents may fundamentally shift their investment strategy
in the presence of risk, eschewing any attempt at trying to reach the high-level
equilibrium open to them, creating added avoidable chronic poverty.
Among other things, these simulations show that in the presence of critical as-
set thresholds, risk takes on particular importance for those individuals subject
to multiple equilibria. Social protection policies could in principal generate
large returns for such individuals, as the next two sections describe. Further-
more, this response to risk adds an important twist to the moral hazard that
naturally results from any policy that attempts to reduce risk exposure, as we
discuss in section 4.
17 Subscript nr represents no-risk. i￿




fu(f(￿;kt) ￿ it) + ￿Vnr(kt+1jkt;it)g
= max
it
fu(f(￿;kt) ￿ it) + ￿Vnr(it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt)g
18 Details on these simulation results are available from the authors by request.
122 Accumulation, Growth and the Evolution of Poverty in the Ab-
sence of Social Protection
The analysis in the prior section has shown that both the anticipation and
the experience of economic shocks have a fundamental e⁄ect on behavior and
welfare in the presence of poverty traps, expanding the portion of the endow-
ment space from which people do not escape poverty through their own e⁄orts.
This observation suggests that social protection policies have a fundamental
role to play in stimulating poverty reduction and economic growth. But how
should social protection be designed in a world of poverty traps? As a ￿rst
step towards answering this question, this section uses the model of individ-
ual decisionmaking developed above as the basis for analyzing accumulation,
growth and poverty in a stylized economy lacking any social protection poli-
cies. Section 3 will then take a careful look at the impact of alternative social
protection schemes on this economy.
2.1 The Stylized Economy and Measures of Performance
Consider now an economy comprised of agents whose livelihood choices are
described by inter-temporal maximization problems (2). To keep things sim-
ple, we will assume that all shocks are idiosyncratic and that prices in the
economy are una⁄ected by shocks and by individuals￿decisions. While these
assumptions are clearly at odds with the real world, they permit us in the
￿rst instance to clarify basic principles and tradeo⁄s in the design of social
protection policies. 19
For purposes of the numerical analysis, we assume that there are 100 agents,
each described by a skill and initial capital stock pair. We allocated agents
along the skill continuum, with 25% each in the intrinsically chronically poor
and upwardly mobile ranges, and half the agents in the intermediate ability
range where endowments matter to their accumulation and welfare trajecto-
ries. Each agent was then assigned a random initial capital stock drawn from
a uniform distribution over the zero to ten range. While in any existing econ-
omy we would expect there to be a correlation between skill and observed
capital stock, this random assignment of capital creates an experimental envi-
ronment in which to study asset dynamics under alternative social protection
schemes.
19 When shocks are correlated across households, asset and other prices will begin to
covary with household income. The implications of this covariance can be important
as Carter, Little, Mogues and Negatu (2007) discuss empirically in the case of
Ethiopia. Zimmerman and Carter (2003) theoretically examine the implications of
such asset price covariance, showing that it can create another type of poverty trap.




























































Fig. 2. Asset Evolution with and without Social Protection
The diagram in the northwest corner of Figure 2 shows the initial distribution
of ability and wealth in this stylized economy. Each symbol on the graph
represents an individual agent. The solid line is the Micawber Threshold
under the stochastic environment, while the dashed line is the asset poverty
line.
We employ the following core measures to track economic performance of the
stylized economy under alternative social protection regimes: 20
(1) Production Measures, including household income, national income (de-
￿ned as the sum of the incomes of the 100 agents) and technology adop-
tion (de￿ned as the fraction of agents who adopt the higher yielding
20 In work not reported here, we also analyzed the impacts of the di⁄erent policies
using a conventional Benthamite social welfare function as well as the dynamic
poverty measures suggested by Calvo and Dercon (2007). The qualitative story
told by these measures is similar to that which can be gleaned from the measures
discussed here.
14technology). Under the initial asset distribution, the GDP of this styl-
ized economy is 187, with 60% of individuals initially using the high
yielding technology.
(2) Standard static poverty measures based on the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke













where n is total number of individuals, yp is income poverty line, yi is
individual i￿ s income, and ￿ is the usual FGT sensitivity parameter. We
will speci￿cally focus on the popular headcount (P
y
0) and poverty gap
(P
y
1) measures. As discussed above, we set the poverty line yp at the
level of income that a high skill individual would produce in steady state
if she had access only to the low technology. Under the initial asset
distribution, the poverty headcount (FGT(0)) is 33% and the poverty
gap (FGT(1)) is 0.07.
(3) Gini coe¢ cient measures of inequality, for both income and assets, which
begin at 0.16 and 0.30, respectively, under the initial asset distribution.
(4) A new, conceptual measure of unnecessary deprivation, Dy
￿; which mea-
sures the "potential gap." This measure resembles the FGT poverty gap
measure, in that it continues to focus just on those with current income
beneath the income poverty line, yp;but with the important re￿nement
that rather than comparing individuals￿realized income against yp, cur-
rent income is compared instead against the income level associated with




L(￿i)g; if its initial wealth endowment did not
constrain equilibrium selection, as it does for some households of inter-
mediate ability. As with the FGT measure, ￿ is a sensitivity parameter,
with ￿=0 o⁄ering a headcount of those who su⁄er unnecessary depriva-
tion, ￿=1 measuring the money metric gap between potential and current
well-being, and ￿>1 placing greater weight on larger underperformance
relative to potential. In our subsequent calculations, we report only the



















This measure captures unnecessary deprivation, in that chronically poor in-
dividuals who achieve their steady state income level (i.e., f(￿i;k
￿(￿i)) = yi)
realize their full potential and have zero weight in this measure, as do the
non-poor (for whom yi > yp). Instead, the "potential gap" captures mainly
those of intermediate skill who are trapped in a low-level equilibrium or those
who are presently far from their long-run equilibrium (e.g., upwardly mobile
15individuals with very low initial endowments). This measure is impractical in
empirical work, since it relies on an estimate of steady-state capital holdings
conditional on unobservable ability; it is nonetheless helpful as a conceptual
tool for distinguishing unnecessary poverty from that which is unavoidable
given individuals￿immutable endowments and the economic environment in
which they operate.
These core, period-by-period measures permit us to capture both the social
costs (foregone output and unexploited technological opportunities) and the
human costs (low standards of living and unnecessary deprivation) of poverty
traps.
2.2 Baseline Case of No Social Protection
The northeast panel of Figure 2 shows the asset distribution after 50 years
of simulated history for our stylized economy. As can be seen, the asset
distribution (which was originally randomly distributed independently of the
ability distribution) has bifurcated, with a strong positive correlation between
innate ability and wealth. One set of individuals has comfortably settled above
the Micawber Frontier at the high technology steady state. The other group
is at the low level steady state, below the asset poverty line. There are quite a
few poor individuals in the middle ability group whose potential to reach the
high equilibrium has been blocked by their low inherited (or realized) asset
levels that lock them below the Micawber Frontier. In this long-run state,
the bifurcation is such that there is no transitory poverty ￿re￿ ected in the
absence of observations between the Micawber frontier and the asset poverty
line.
With no exogenous technical change or growth in productive inputs to stimu-
late growth and modest investment incentives for a large portion of the popu-
lation, GDP in this baseline economy is relatively stagnant over time (Figure
3, northwest quadrant). This re￿ ects the fact that the positive accumulation
and associated productivity gains of those above the Micawber Frontier is o⁄-
set by the lost potential ￿and wealth deaccumulation and productivity decline
￿of many of those trapped below it. The decline among some sub-populations
is manifest in the disadoption of the high technology, use of which falls from
roughly 60% to only 40% of the population. Further re￿ ection of this eco-
nomic bifurcation is found in the increasing levels of poverty, measured both
as a poverty headcount (northeast quadrant) as well as by the poverty gap
indicator (southwest quadrant) and our new unnecessary deprivation measure
(southeast quadrant). Income inequality (not shown) declines modestly over
the ￿rst decade of the simulations, then increases above the initial level by

























Fig. 3. Evolution of Economy-wide Indicators under Alternative Forms of Relief
lackluster performance of the base case poverty trap economy illustrates both
the human and aggregate economic costs of poverty traps. The next sections
consider alternative policy regimes that might lead to better outcomes.
3 Designing Unanticipated Social Relief to Manage the Ex Post
E⁄ects of Shocks
This section examines the impact of alternative social relief policies on our
stylized economy. We use the term "social relief" to signal that these poli-
cies are implemented ex post of shocks and we (unrealistically) assume away
agents￿anticipation of the resulting transfers and the behavioral response that
follows from such anticipation. In section 4 we explore "social protection" poli-
cies that are properly anticipated by households, who adjust their behaviors
accordingly. The purpose of the present, intermediate step is to make clear the
value of addressing the purely ex post e⁄ects of asset shocks, even if agents
17cannot or do not expect transfers.
For all alternatives, we assume that the operational agency 21 has access to an
annual income stream or budget of B = 5, which amounts to 2.5% of initial
GDP. 22 This amount was chosen because it is insu¢ cient to lift all initially
poor individuals above the poverty line, though it is enough to substantially
close the poverty gap. We further assume that the operational agency has
access to full information, including household ability and asset holdings, re-
alized shocks and knowledge of the production technology. While these are
strong assumptions (and underwrite unrealistically perfect targeting), using
them to explore targeting of this limited assistance budget helps further illus-
trate the workings of the poverty trap economy. Based on those ￿ndings, we
explore alternative regimes that can e⁄ectively link relief to development.
3.1 Poverty and Aid Traps under Needs-based Assistance
Under the needs-based scenario, the agency uses its budget only for humani-
tarian transfers. After each production cycle, it calculates the total poverty
shortfall for the economy, S =
P
yi<yp(yp￿yi). If the available budget exceeds
the shortfall (B
S > 1), then all poor individuals are given transfers to increase
their income to the level of the poverty line. If B
S < 1, then each poor individ-
ual is given transfers that move them to an income level equal to B
Syp. Note
that this targeting methods makes the largest transfers to the least well-o⁄.
This analysis also arti￿cially assumes that individuals do not anticipate in-
come transfers. That is, once individuals receive the transfer, they make their
consumption versus investment decision according to maximization of prob-
lem (2) above and (myopically) assume that future transfers will never occur.
Section 4 relaxes this strong assumption, but for now it helps to understand
the di⁄erent e⁄ects of alternative designs based on this extreme simplifying
assumption.
The impact of this needs-based assistance regime on asset distribution can be
seen in the southwest diagram in Figure 2. The ￿gure is quite similar to that
under autarchy, except that asset levels are somewhat higher for those below
the poverty line, especially among lower ability persons (re￿ ecting a transfer
rule based on realized income levels). Turning to Figure 3, we see that the
21 We use the broad term "operational agency" to encompass local or national gov-
ernment as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that might respond to
shocks.
22 We ignore the source of taxation that generates these resources and the associated
distortionary e⁄ects on the economy. They could be conceptualized as either ex-
ternal resources (brought in by a donor, an NGO or a relief agency), or as domestic
tax resources transferred from another sector of the national economy.
18poverty headcount and unnecessary deprivation measure under needs-based
assistance follows a trajectory nearly identical to that under autarchy. The
FGT(1) poverty gap measure is substantially lower under needs-based assis-
tance than without the assistance, re￿ ecting the added resources introduced
into the system exogenously. But we can also see that the FGT(1) steadily
rises after year 10 of the simulation. GDP is higher in the economy with needs-
based transfer, but purely due to the extra 2.5% of GDP assumed available
each year.
In a world where budgets for transfers are available exogenously (e.g., via
unrequited transfers associated with overseas development assistance), needs-
based transfers plainly reduces income and asset poverty, if only because there
are added resources in this scenario. However, these transfers do not funda-
mentally alter the economy￿ s dynamics. Indeed, the troubling irony is that
poverty grows in this economy in spite of these transfers as some agents su⁄er
asset shocks that drop them into poverty but then receive insu¢ cient transfers
to enable them to climb back out of poverty on their own. Transfer policies
that are not designed to respond to the poverty trap mechanism systemati-
cally fail to prevent more people from inadvertently falling into the trap over
time.
These results signal what might be termed a relief trap. By failing to stem
the ￿ ow of intermediate ability individuals below the Micawber Frontier, the
￿xed aid budget becomes less and less able to meet the needs of those below
the poverty line. If the operational agency (or the international community)
were intent on holding poverty at, say, year 10 levels, then increasing fractions
of total public expenditures would need to be devoted to aid budgets. We
abstract here from the standard public ￿nance problems of raising revenues,
but clearly the growing demands for transfers would have to be met either
through increasingly distortionary taxation or through reducing funds avail-
able for developing new technologies, building schools and infrastructure, or
other interventions (not modeled here) that are aimed at boosting productiv-
ity.
Poverty traps can thus, in a very direct way, create relief traps. In their
analysis of food aid, Barrett and Maxwell (2005) present evidence that such a
relief trap may be emerging at a global scale. Current O¢ cial Development
Assistance (ODA) ￿gures from the OECD show that even though real ODA
increased more than 60% since the mid-1970s, the share of ODA devoted to
emergency assistance had increased far faster, ten-fold, from only 1% of total
ODA to 10% over the same period.
193.2 Triage or Threshold-targeted Social Relief
As the prior simulations make clear, risk in our model poverty trap econ-
omy creates an ever increasing amount of unnecessary poverty that eventually
overwhelms the capacity of needs-based assistance to provide relief. This ob-
servation suggests that a social relief scheme targeted at the threshold de￿ned
by the Micawber Frontier ￿i.e., a safety net designed to stem the increase in
needless poverty ￿can potentially generate a win-win-win scenario, with higher
rates of improved technology adoption and GDP growth, reduced poverty (es-
pecially for intermediate ability groups), and less stress on the operational
agency￿ s budget.
To explore this idea, we initially analyze an admittedly harsh triage policy
regime in which the agency provides transfers to households according to the
following rule:
(1) The budget, B, is ￿rst allocated to individuals recently pushed below the
Micawber Frontier. Denote these threshold-based transfers as productive
safety net (PSN) transfers. An individual is eligible for a PSN transfer
of PSNi = ~ k(￿i) ￿ ￿it[iit + (1 ￿ ￿)kit] if iit + (1 ￿ ￿)kit > ~ k(￿i) and
￿it[iit + (1 ￿ ￿)kit] < ~ k(￿i). In words, if an individual was above the
Micawber Threshold prior to the most recent asset shock, but below it
afterward, the agency provides a transfer to move the household back
to the Micawber Frontier. If the total budget (PSN =
P
i=1 PSNi)
exceeds the total eligible transfers, then all individuals pushed below
the threshold are given an asset transfer to lift them back to it. If the
budget is insu¢ cient, then it is allocated ￿rst to those closest to the
Micawber Frontier so as to minimize the increase in the headcount of
needless poverty.
(2) If there is any remained budget after step 1 (i.e., if B > PSN), then those
mid-ability individuals already below the Micawber Frontier (due to low
initial inheritance or prior bad luck not stemmed by a PSN transfer) are
given priority for cargo net transfers that lift them over the Micawber
Frontier. 23 Analogous to stage 1, total potential spending on cargo net
transfers is calculated (denote this total amount as CN). If CN > B ￿
PSN, then the budget is again prioritized in order to minimize headcount
poverty, by ￿rst helping those closest to the Micawber Frontier.
(3) If B > PSN + CN, then the residual budget is allocated according to
the needs-based formulation discussed in the previous sub-section.
23 The term "cargo net" was coined by Barrett (2005) and refers to transfers in-
tended to lift people above ￿or help people climb over ￿thresholds at which ac-
cumulation dynamics bifurcate, as distinct from safety nets, which prevent people
from falling beneath those same thresholds.
20Figure 3 again illustrates the results of this assistance regime for our styl-
ized poverty trap economy. The results stand in strong contrast to autarchy
and needs-based assistance simulation. By year 50, all needless poverty is
eliminated and the headcount of total poverty levels o⁄ at 25%, the share of
the population that is intrinsically chronically poor by construction. Technol-
ogy adoption is high, as is GDP (and GDP growth). In the longer-run, this
triage approach to development assistance plainly outperforms needs-based
assistance by any of these metrics.
However, the southwest diagram in Figure 3 illustrates one of the major chal-
lenges associated with this form of development assistance. The FGT(1)
poverty gap measure is lower under needs-based assistance for the ￿rst 10-
15 years of the simulation because needs-based assistance is targeted to the
least well-o⁄while the stylized triage policies are targeted to those nearest the
Micawber Frontier. After 10-15 years, the remaining poor are better o⁄under
PSN design because it reduces the number of people needing assistance, allow-
ing the ￿xed budget to provide more generous support to those who inevitably
need it. However, prior to that time, individuals who are poor, and especially
the poorest, are better o⁄under needs-based targeting. The results for (asset
or income) inequality (not shown) are qualitatively similar, with needs-based
transfers generating lower inequality in the economy over the ￿rst nine years,
but threshold-based transfers generating lower inequality over longer hori-
zons. These results underscore the di¢ cult tradeo⁄s inherent to the design of
social relief policy, both over time ￿do we care for the poor better today or
tomorrow? ￿and across sub-populations of the poor ￿do we focus on helping
those who, with a bit of assistance, can then pull themselves out of poverty
by their bootstraps or on those who will su⁄er low living standards in the
absence of assistance of inde￿nite duration? In the presence of poverty traps,
these tradeo⁄s become especially sharp. Policymakers need to weigh these
tradeo⁄s and design social relief policy accordingly. 24
24 In additional simulations not reported here, we considered whether these tradeo⁄s
could be mitigated by mixing di⁄erent kinds of transfers and/or by reallocating
budgets intertemporally through borrowing. While these alternatives can reduce
the magnitude of the tradeo⁄s reported here somewhat, they cannot be eliminated
entirely. This underscores the unavoidable nature of the targeting tradeo⁄s in both
cross-section (between di⁄erent sub-populations of the poor and vulnerable) and
over time in a poverty trap economy.
214 Using Safety Nets to Reduce the Ex Ante E⁄ects of Risk in the
Presence of Moral Hazard
In the previous section we assumed that households do not react to social
relief interventions. However, one would naturally expect agents to adapt their
behaviors to a known transfer regime. Indeed, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1995) show that social insurance programs discourage precautionary savings
in the United States. In this section we therefore relax the previous assumption
and consider households￿response to safety net transfers and the implication
of such endogenous response for the design of productive safety nets. We do not
consider households￿endogenous response to needs-based transfers, both in the
interests of brevity and because the induced behavioral e⁄ects are conceptually
simpler than those with respect to safety net transfers, for reasons we explain
below.
4.1 Positive and Negative Moral Hazard
We expect two kinds of household response to safety net transfers. First,
since safety net transfers mitigate asset risk, households are willing to accu-
mulate more assets ceteris paribus. This is canonical moral hazard, in that the
provision of some insurance induces increased risk taking. 25 In this model,
accumulation of assets subject to stochastic shocks is the only risk-taking be-
havior available to agents. But asset accumulation is socially desirable in this
setting, as it increases productivity and adoption of improved production tech-
nologies, increases GDP and reduces poverty. We therefore call this incentive
e⁄ect ￿positive moral hazard.￿
Second, because the safety net transfers are conditional (on pre- and post-
shock asset holdings) and given the standard intertemporal tradeo⁄ between
current consumption and saving for future consumption, ceteris paribus house-
holds have an incentive to satisfy the transfer condition as often as possible so
as to receive extra transfers. If the agency will insure them against falling into
a poverty trap, households do not need to self-insure through asset accumu-
lation to the same degree, thereby creating a disincentive to invest that runs
counter to social objectives. We therefore label this e⁄ect "negative moral
hazard".
The trick in designing safety net policy is to maximize the positive moral haz-
ard e⁄ects and minimize the negative ones. In the remainder of this subsection,
25 Recognize that risk is increasing in asset holdings because ￿ is a multiplicative
shock and independent of k: Therefore, stochastic losses are greater when k is larger.
22we explore the behavioral consequences of the simple PSN triage policy out-
lined in the previous section. We show that awareness of the safety net shifts
the Micawber Frontier in a complex way due to the dual e⁄ects of positive
and negative moral hazard, expanding the share of ability-wealth space from
within which lower-intermediate ability households naturally gravitate toward
the higher level technology and equilibrium. But it also induces signi￿cant
negative moral hazard, as households that would otherwise accumulate as-
sets and adopt the high technology become far more likely to settle around
the Frontier, maximizing current consumption and the likelihood of indem-
nity payments from the operational agency￿ s transfer scheme. In the next
subsection we modify the safety net design slightly and show how this can
substantially mitigate negative moral hazard.
Assume that the productive safety net (PSN) design is as before, with the var-
ious strong assumptions about perfect information on agents￿ability, wealth
and experience of shocks. 26 The agency publicly (and credibly) announces
that it will insure against potentially catastrophic asset loss by making in-
demnity payments to any household that experiences a negative shock that
drives its asset holdings below the autarchy Micawber Frontier ~ k(￿), with
the amount of the transfer exactly the amount that restores the household￿ s
wealth to ~ k(￿). 27
As before, each household maximizes its expected lifetime utility given agency












~ k(￿) if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt > kg and ￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] < ~ k(￿)
￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] otherwise
(4)
k1;~ k(￿) given
This is the same as the problem speci￿ed in section 1 except for the important
change in the law of motion governing kt+1 now that households are aware of
and respond to the agency transfer policy. 28
The main result is that the anticipated safety net transfer induces some house-
26 If the government cannot observe or verify ￿; an adverse selection problem arises
too. We abstract from that possibility here.
27 The existence of anticipated social insurance will of course endogenously change
the Micawber Frontier so that the true threshold under insurance will be di⁄erent
than the insured capital stock.
28 The household problem at period t can be represented in Bellman Equation form
23holds to change their target capital level, from either the low or the high
equilibrium levels, to the threshold at which the agency guarantees them
insurance. This insurance equilibrium induces added asset accumulation by
those at the low end of the intermediate ability range, but discourages asset
accumulation and improved technology adoption by those in the upper end
of the intermediate ability range. The northwest diagram in Figure 4 again
shows the distribution of households in ability-asset space at t = 50 under
autarchy and the Micawber Frontier by a solid line. The northeast diagram
in Figure 4 shows the distribution under the safety net transfer scheme and
adds the new, endogenous Micawber Frontier (the dashed line) to that which
arises when agents do not adapt their behavior to the agency transfer policy.
More intermediate ability households now move towards ~ k(￿) instead of either
the low or high equilibrium asset levels. Fewer households with ability in the
low-intermediate range, ￿ 2 [1:04;1:06], remain at the low technology equilib-
rium asset level than under autarchy; they increase their investment following
positive moral hazard. However, households in the upper-intermediate range,
￿ 2 [1:08;1:14]; become less likely to adopt the improved technology and hold
less wealth when they anticipate the safety net transfers than when they do
not. This re￿ ects the negative moral hazard created by a guaranteed transfer.
For those intermediate ability agents who would, in the absence of the safety
net, accumulate capital to the high-level equilibrium, the safety net reduces
their need to sacri￿ce current consumption in order to self-insure, thereby re-
ducing savings and investment. The especially pernicious feature of negative
moral hazard in this setting is thus that it not only increases agency indem-
nity payments by inducing households to choose a steady state capital stock
near the payout threshold, but it also reduces household risk-taking via asset
accumulation.
Figure 5 gives intuition for the emergence of this new behavior. Note that
nature essentially acts as a tax collector in this model, probabilistically tak-
ing away a fraction of assets every period. Absent safety nets, the nature￿ s
expected marginal tax rate in this model is 1.7%, as shown by the solid line in
Figure 5. Under the safety net scheme, individuals exactly at the safety net
point (~ k(￿)) face a zero marginal tax rate as all asset losses are covered by
safety net transfers. However, assets accumulated beyond the safety net trans-
as:
V (kt) ￿ max
it
fu(f(￿;kt) ￿ it) + ￿E [V (kt+1jkt;it)]g





kg if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt > kg and ￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] < kg
￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] otherwise







































































































Temporary Fuzzy Social Protection
Fig. 4. Moral Hazard with Alternative Social Protection Policies
fer point face a sharply increasing marginal tax rate. As shown by the dotted
line in Figure 5, under the standard safety net the marginal tax rate abruptly
jumps from zero to 10%, and then slowly decreases to the natural tax rate
of 1.7%. It is this sharp and discontinuous elimination of social protection
as the individual moves away from the insured point ~ k(￿) that discourages
accumulation and leads to a class of agents who become welfare dependent.
There is an obvious analogy of this problem to that of an earlier generation
of US welfare programs whose rapid elimination of bene￿ts when an earned
income threshold was crossed created extremely high e⁄ective marginal tax
rates on earned income. As with those program, a solution can be found by
relaxing the rate at which the social protection bene￿ts are eliminated so as








































No Safety Net (Autarchy)
k~(a)
Fig. 5. Nature￿ s Marginal Tax Rates under Alternative Social Protection Schemes
4.2 Fuzzy Safety Nets
The previous subsection demonstrated that when households naturally antic-
ipate and react to the agency￿ s implementation of safety net transfers, the
resulting negative moral hazard sharply reduces asset accumulation, GDP,
technology adoption and long-run poverty reduction (compared to what can
be achieved when agents myopically do not anticipate social protection). This
subsection outlines a way to overcome most of the negative moral hazard
problem by modifying the simple safety net transfer scheme studied above.
Our modi￿cation is two-fold. First, we mitigate the negative e⁄ects of the
safety net transfer on incentives to accumulate more than the asset threshold
the agency uses to determine transfer eligibility by using a ￿fuzzy￿transfer
scheme we describe in detail below. Second, the agency announces that safety
net transfer scheme is temporary. If the policy period is long enough to permit
some households to accumulate assets greater than the Micawber Frontier, be-
fore the safety net policy lapses, they move to the high technology equilibrium
asset level afterward but are thereafter vulnerable to catastrophic asset shocks
against which the safety net previously protected them. This sort of sunset
26clause to the policy is of course consistent with the well-known point that in
the presence of multiple equilibria, temporary interventions can have perma-
nent e⁄ects. Short-lived productive safety nets can stimulate additional asset
accumulation and technology adoption by those intermediate ability agents
who would otherwise remain chronically poor without inducing dependence
on safety net transfers.
Turning to the ￿rst modi￿cation of the safety net, we can substantially mit-
igate the distortions created by the high marginal tax rates discussed in the
prior section by modifying the productive safety net scheme. We replace the
variable transfer to a ￿xed target asset level with a variable, fuzzy transfer
to a variable ex post asset stock. Transfers now return the household to a
convex combination of its pre-shock asset holdings, it+(1￿￿)kt, and its post-
shock realized wealth, ￿t[it +(1￿￿)kt]. The technical details are presented in
Appendix 2. But the essence of this fuzzy safety net scheme is that expected
indemnity payments in the event of loss do not decline one-for-one as agents
increase their asset holdings. While expected payments are still declining in
wealth, they decline more slowly, thereby attenuating the increase in the im-
plicit marginal tax on investment. The dashed line in Figure 5 depicts the
resulting expected marginal tax rate under this fuzzy safety net transfer. As
can be seen, the sharp jump in the marginal tax rate is eliminated and the im-
plicit marginal tax rate on investment is now increasing rather than decreasing
in wealth beyond the threshold, generating a more progressive scheme.
The consequence of this change in e⁄ective marginal taxation of asset accu-
mulation is striking. The southwest diagram in Figure 4 depicts household
distribution in ability-asset space after 50 years and the Micawber Frontier
under the fuzzy safety net transfer. By comparing the southwest diagram
with the northeast in Figure 4, we see that the positive moral hazard e⁄ect
is magni￿ed by the fuzzy safety net, relative to the standard safety net, and
that negative moral hazard is almost fully extinguished. There are no longer
households settling at the insurance threshold ~ k(￿), receiving transfers but
not adopting the improved technology. A substantial cohort of intermedi-
ate ability households now optimally accumulate more wealth, moving them
comfortably above the Micawber Frontier, although the asset holdings of in-
termediate ability households remain below those that obtain in the naive
safety nets model under which households act as if the transfer scheme does
not exist (depicted in the southwest diagram in Figure 4).
The second re￿nement we make is to put a sunset clause on the safety net
scheme, i.e., the agency announces in the ￿rst period that it will terminate
safety net transfer scheme at t = Tg: We call this the temporary fuzzy safety
net transfer policy. The southeast diagram in Figure 4 depicts the resulting
household distribution in ability-asset space at t = 50 and the Micawber Fron-
27tier under the temporary fuzzy safety net transfer with Tg = 20: 29 By making
a credible announcement that the safety net will not persist inde￿nitely, agency
can take advantage of the positive moral hazard (investment-inducing) e⁄ects
of the transfer scheme and, in the longer-term after Tg has passed, avoid the
negative moral hazard e⁄ects. The Micawber Frontier expands leftward and
down during the life of the fuzzy safety net policy, giving more households
an incentive to invest, to adopt improved technologies and thereby to grow
their way out of chronic poverty. Of course, after the policy lapses, the Micaw-
ber Frontier shifts back, and those who are subsequently shocked beneath the
autarchic Frontier then collapse into chronic poverty. The gains of that policy
thus become ￿nite-lived.
The termination of the safety net transfer thus inevitably involves a tradeo⁄.
If the agency does not terminate the policy, some households stay at asset
levels which are ine¢ cient in the sense that they would accumulate more if
the safety net did not attenuate accumulation incentives, in addition to the
added costs to the agency of making indemnity payments in additional periods.
On the other hand, if the agency terminates the policy, some households with
moderate ability may subsequently experience negative asset shocks and be
knocked beneath the Micawber Frontier and onto the undesirable path toward
the low technology, poverty trap equilibrium.
The northwest diagram in Figure 6 shows the GDP timepaths under the
two di⁄erent policy schemes as well as under autarchy (no safety net policy)
and the needs-based social relief policy from section 3. GDP is ultimately
markedly higher under either safety net program, as compared to the econ-
omy in autarchy. 30 But the GDP path under the temporary fuzzy safety net
lies signi￿cantly above that for the permanent fuzzy safety net transfer, imply-
ing that the induced increase in asset accumulation ￿due to the anticipation
of safety net termination as much as by the event itself ￿more than o⁄sets
the decrease in GDP due to households that subsequently su⁄er shocks. The
resulting gap is of course greatest at Tg (year 20) because the added invest-
29 We solve the resulting optimization problem backward: First, solve the problem
at t ￿ Tg + 1 and obtain V (kt;t) and i￿
r(kt;tj￿;￿) for t ￿ Tg + 1; which are the
same as those under autarchy. Second, given V (kTg+1;Tg + 1), solve the problem
at t = Tg and obtain V (kTg;Tg) and i￿
r(kTg;Tgj￿;￿). Third, given V (kTg;Tg), solve
the problem at t = Tg ￿ 1 and obtain V (kTg￿1;Tg ￿ 1) and i￿
r(kTg￿1;Tg ￿ 1j￿;￿).
Iterate this backward until t = 1.
30 For almost 15 years, the needs-based relief scheme outperforms the other schemes
illustrated here. However, as the southeast graph in Figure 6 shows, the amount
of transfers under the needs-based scheme is almost double that under the other
schemes. Given this budget di⁄erence, it is remarkable that under the fuzzy safety
net scheme, GDP catches up and eventually surpasses that under the needs-based
scheme. This result clearly illustrates that the former schemes are working by

























Fig. 6. Evolution of Indicators under Alternative Social Protection Regimes
ment incentives apply throughout the simulation but the absence of the safety
net is only felt after that time. The GDP gap between the two safety net
schemes steadily narrows thereafter as the loss of asset protection after safety
net termination begins to slowly take a toll.
That toll is most starkly re￿ ected by the poverty headcount and unnecessary
deprivation indicators shown in the northeast and southwest diagrams of Fig-
ure 6, respectively. The temporary fuzzy safety net outperforms the permanent
fuzzy safety net by both measures up until the former policy terminates. After
year 20 (Tg), poverty and unnecessary deprivation remain steadily low under
the fuzzy safety net policy but trend upward in the economy whose safety net
has lapsed.
We do not impose budget constraints on the fuzzy safety net transfer policy
since it is not easy to calculate the equilibrium in which household￿ s expecta-
tions of the timing and amount of transfer receipts are consistent with actual
29timing and amount of transfer receipts and budgets constraints are satis￿ed.
But as the southeast diagram in Figure 6 indicates, the fuzzy safety net policy
tends to cost the operational agency far less than the needs-based transfers
under a ￿xed budget explored in section 3. The time-discounted present value
of actual spending for the permanent fuzzy safety net transfers is 43.6, less
than half the 95.2 cost of the needs-based transfers. The discounted present
value cost of the temporary fuzzy transfer policy is only 27.3 due to its shorter
lifespan. Thus in cost-bene￿t terms using any of our key indicators, social pol-
icy based on productive safety nets outperforms either autarchy (no assistance
to poor or vulnerable households) or needs-based social relief policy.
5 Conclusions
This paper has put forward a stochastic dynamic programming model of a
poverty trap economy in which asset risk plays a major role and heterogeneity
of individual ability creates two types of chronic poverty. Some people are
chronically poor because their innate ability condemns them to a low standard
of living. Others su⁄er unnecessary deprivation simply because they are born
with insu¢ cient access to productive capital and are below the critical asset
threshold needed to make it dynamically optimal to undertake the short-term
sacri￿ces inherent to long-term investment.
Using this framework, we show that needs-based, unanticipated social relief
policies can fall prey to an aid trap in which income support to the poorest of
the poor ￿predominantly the intrinsically chronically poor ￿crowds out asset
protection for those of intermediate ability and wealth who are vulnerable
to shocks. Members of this latter group steadily fall into needless chronic
poverty, adding to the pool of individuals needing income support. The result
is that while the depth of poverty is initially reduced among the poorest of
the poor, their lot deteriorates over time due to increasing competition for
limited relief resources. Moreover, the numbers of people su⁄ering poverty
do not change appreciably, nor does wealth accumulation, economic output or
adoption rates of improved technologies.
We then show that an unanticipated triage policy that prioritizes threshold-
targeted social protection for the intermediate wealth and ability group creates
a ￿productive safety net￿that largely eliminates needless chronic poverty and
boosts growth through endogenous asset accumulation and adoption of im-
proved technologies. While this triage policy still confronts important trade-
o⁄s among di⁄erent poor people and over time, this theoretical exercise es-
tablishes the potential gains to threshold-targeted social protection.
As the Lucas critique famously showed, any policy naturally induces a be-
30havioral response. We therefore go on to explore what happens when social
protection is fully anticipated and demonstrate how safety nets have a complex
e⁄ect on individuals￿investment behavior in the presence of poverty traps. In
particular, an anticipated safety net induces some individuals to accumulate
more assets than they would otherwise, which naturally stimulates economic
activity and reduces poverty. But anticipated social protection also discour-
ages others from investing beyond the range where they remain eligible for
transfers, as externally-provided insurance e⁄ectively displaces self-insurance
through asset accumulation. This e⁄ect retards economic growth, technology
adoption and progress in the ￿ght against poverty. We term these e⁄ects pos-
itive and negative moral hazard, respectively. The balance between them is
manipulable through the design of the safety net. We show that by altering
the payo⁄ scheme slightly and by introducing a credible, known sunset clause
to terminate the safety net program after a period of years, the positive e⁄ects
can be magni￿ed and the negative ones e⁄ectively extinguished. Of course, the
price of these gains is the loss of safety net protection beyond the expiration
of the policy, which leads to later increases in poverty.
Ultimately, the key ￿nding of this paper is that poverty traps can have a
pronounced e⁄ect on the performance and appropriate design of policy in-
tended to stimulate poverty reduction, economic growth and uptake of im-
proved production technologies. There are potentially large returns to devel-
oping and using knowledge about critical asset thresholds to target assistance
in economies characterized by poverty traps. Whatever its analytical com-
plexity, the analysis here has nonetheless massively oversimpli￿ed the real
world. Improvements to the model are clearly possible, perhaps especially by
endogenizing the ability parameter, ￿: The more substantive research agenda,
however, likely involves empirically identifying critical asset thresholds (the
Micawber Frontier, as we have called it) and then seeing if threshold-targeted
assistance can really liberate human potential to craft pathways from poverty.
31Appendix 1: Parameters and Other Details for Numeri-
cal Simulation
This section provides additional detail on the formal model used to generate
the results discussed in the main body of the paper.






The probability density of ￿t is assumed to be:
density of ￿t =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0:90 if ￿t = 1:0
0:05 if ￿t = 0:9
0:03 if ￿t = 0:8
0:02 if ￿t = 0:7
The other structural parameter values are assumed as follows: ￿ = 1:5;￿ =
0:08;￿ = 0:95, ￿L = 0:3;￿H = 0:45;E = 0:45.
We discretize continuous variables k and ￿ as follows: k = f0:1;0:2;:::;15:0g
and ￿ = f0:94;0:96;:::;1:22g.
For the simulation of the stylized economy of 100 individuals we draw ￿ from
N(1:08;0:0742), with the mean and variance chosen so that ex ante proportion
of low, middle, and high type individuals (de￿ned relative to the stochastic
Micawber Frontier) would be 25%, 50%, and 25%, respectively. We draw k1
from Uniform[0:1;10:0] and assume that k1 and ￿ are statistically independent
from each other.
We specify poverty line as follows. The asset level which generates income
exactly equal to the poverty line satis￿es the following equation:
yp = f(￿;kp):
where yp is income-based poverty line. That asset level obviously depends on ￿
and we denote it by kp(￿). We assume that an intermediate ability individual
would fall below the income poverty line if he used the low technology and
thus set poverty line by kp(￿ = 1:12) = 3:4 and thus yp = 1:62.
32Appendix 2: Fuzzy Safety Net Transfers
Denote the safety net insurance threshold as kg. In order to decrease the
negative moral hazard e⁄ect of safety net transfers, i.e., the disincentive to
accumulate assets beyond kg, we smooth kt+1 in (it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt;kt+1) space.
The best way to understand the idea is to draw ￿gures in (it +(1￿￿)kt;kt+1)
space. Under section 3￿ s assumptions, when a household gets ￿t < 1, the kt+1
line is ￿ at in the region it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt 2 (kg;kg=￿t): Thus the expected loss
due to a negative asset shock increases rapidly when a household increases
it+(1￿￿)kt from kg to kg=￿t. This is why some households stick at the point
where kt = kg.
In section 4, we modify safety net transfer so that kt+1is increasing in the
region it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt 2 (kg;kg=￿t) where ￿ < 1 and thus the expected loss
increases less rapidly when a household increases it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt from kg to
kg=￿t than occurs under the previous PSN design. Under the new transfer
scheme, kt+1 follows the following transition rule:
kt+1(kt;it;￿t;kg;￿) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[￿(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))￿t)][it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt]
if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt > kg
and ￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] > ￿gkg
￿t[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt] otherwise
(5)
where ￿g > 1 is a constant the agency sets (we let ￿g = 1:5) and ￿(￿) 2 [0;1]
is a function of it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt, more precisely





[it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt]:
Note that when a household receives a transfer under this smoothed safety






= 1 if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt = kg
2 (0;1) if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt 2 (kg;￿gkg=￿t)
= 0 if it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt = ￿gkg=￿t
The household problem at period t is:
V (kt) ￿ max
it
fu(f(￿;kt) ￿ it) + ￿E [V (kt+1jkt;it)]g
where E [V (kt+1jkt;it)] =
Z
V (kt+1(kt;it;￿t;kg;￿))d￿(￿t)
where kt+1(kt;it;￿t;kg;￿) is de￿ned by (5).
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Summary Findings
This paper demonstrates that there are potentially large
returns to social protection policy that stakes out a
productive safety net below the vulnerable and keeps
them from slipping into a poverty trap. Much of the
value of the productive safety net comes from mitigating
the ex ante effects of risk and crowding in additional
investment. The analysis also explores the implications
of different mechanisms of targeting social protection
transfers. In the presence of poverty traps, modestly
regressive targeting based on critical asset thresholds
may have better long-run poverty reduction effects than
traditional needs-based targeting.
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